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Abstract
Internet memes are increasingly used to sway and manipulate
public opinion. This prompts the need to study their propa-
gation, evolution, and influence across the Web. In this paper,
we detect and measure the propagation of memes across mul-
tiple Web communities, using a processing pipeline based on
perceptual hashing and clustering techniques, and a dataset of
160M images from 2.6B posts gathered from Twitter, Reddit,
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), and Gab, over the
course of 13 months. We group the images posted on fringe
Web communities (/pol/, Gab, and The Donald subreddit) into
clusters, annotate them using meme metadata obtained from
Know Your Meme, and also map images from mainstream
communities (Twitter and Reddit) to the clusters.
Our analysis provides an assessment of the popularity and
diversity of memes in the context of each community, showing,
e.g., that racist memes are extremely common in fringe Web
communities. We also find a substantial number of politics-
related memes on both mainstream and fringe Web commu-
nities, supporting media reports that memes might be used to
enhance or harm politicians. Finally, we use Hawkes processes
to model the interplay between Web communities and quantify
their reciprocal influence, finding that /pol/ substantially influ-
ences the meme ecosystem with the number of memes it pro-
duces, while The Donald has a higher success rate in pushing
them to other communities.
1 Introduction
The Web has become one of the most impactful vehicles for
the propagation of ideas and culture. Images, videos, and slo-
gans are created and shared online at an unprecedented pace.
Some of these, commonly referred to as memes, become viral,
evolve, and eventually enter popular culture. The term “meme”
was first coined by Richard Dawkins [12], who framed them
as cultural analogues to genes, as they too self-replicate, mu-
tate, and respond to selective pressures [18]. Numerous memes
have become integral part of Internet culture, with well-known
examples including the Trollface [54], Bad Luck Brian [27],
and Rickroll [49].
While most memes are generally ironic in nature, used with
∗A shorter version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of 18th ACM
Internet Measurement Conference (IMC 2018). This is the full version.
no bad intentions, others have assumed negative and/or hateful
connotations, including outright racist and aggressive under-
tones [84]. These memes, often generated by fringe commu-
nities, are being “weaponized” and even becoming part of po-
litical and ideological propaganda [67]. For example, memes
were adopted by candidates during the 2016 US Presidential
Elections as part of their iconography [19]; in October 2015,
then-candidate Donald Trump retweeted an image depicting
him as Pepe The Frog, a controversial character considered
a hate symbol [58]. In this context, polarized communities
within 4chan and Reddit have been working hard to create
new memes and make them go viral, aiming to increase the
visibility of their ideas—a phenomenon known as “attention
hacking” [64].
Motivation. Despite their increasingly relevant role, we have
very little measurements and computational tools to under-
stand the origins and the influence of memes. The online in-
formation ecosystem is very complex; social networks do not
operate in a vacuum but rather influence each other as to how
information spreads [86]. However, previous work (see Sec-
tion 6) has mostly focused on social networks in an isolated
manner.
In this paper, we aim to bridge these gaps by identifying
and addressing a few research questions, which are oriented
towards fringe Web communities: 1) How can we character-
ize memes, and how do they evolve and propagate? 2) Can
we track meme propagation across multiple communities and
measure their influence? 3) How can we study variants of
the same meme? 4) Can we characterize Web communities
through the lens of memes?
Our work focuses on four Web communities: Twitter, Red-
dit, Gab, and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), be-
cause of their impact on the information ecosystem [86]
and anecdotal evidence of them disseminating weaponized
memes [73]. We design a processing pipeline and use it over
160M images posted between July 2016 and July 2017. Our
pipeline relies on perceptual hashing (pHash) and clustering
techniques; the former extracts representative feature vectors
from the images encapsulating their visual peculiarities, while
the latter allow us to detect groups of images that are part of the
same meme. We design and implement a custom distance met-
ric, based on both pHash and meme metadata, obtained from
Know Your Meme (KYM), and use it to understand the in-
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terplay between the different memes. Finally, using Hawkes
processes, we quantify the reciprocal influence of each Web
community with respect to the dissemination of image-based
memes.
Findings. Some of our findings (among others) include:
1. Our influence estimation analysis reveals that /pol/ and
The Donald are influential actors in the meme ecosys-
tem, despite their modest size. We find that /pol/ substan-
tially influences the meme ecosystem by posting a large
number of memes, while The Donald is the most efficient
community in pushing memes to both fringe and main-
stream Web communities.
2. Communities within 4chan, Reddit, and Gab use memes
to share hateful and racist content. For instance, among
the most popular cluster of memes, we find variants of
the anti-semitic “Happy Merchant” meme [36] and the
controversial Pepe the Frog [45].
3. Our custom distance metric effectively reveals the phy-
logenetic relationships of clusters of images. This is evi-
dent from the graph that shows the clusters obtained from
/pol/, Reddit’s The Donald subreddit, and Gab available
for exploration at [1].
Contributions. First, we develop a robust processing pipeline
for detecting and tracking memes across multiple Web com-
munities. Based on pHash and clustering algorithms, it sup-
ports large-scale measurements of meme ecosystems, while
minimizing processing power and storage requirements. Sec-
ond, we introduce a custom distance metric, geared to high-
light hidden correlations between memes and better under-
stand the interplay and overlap between them. Third, we pro-
vide a characterization of multiple Web communities (Twitter,
Reddit, Gab, and /pol/) with respect to the memes they share,
and an analysis of their reciprocal influence using the Hawkes
Processes statistical model. Finally, we release our processing
pipeline and datasets1, in the hope to support further measure-
ments in this space.
2 Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology for measuring the
propagation of memes across Web communities.
2.1 Overview
Memes are high-level concepts or ideas that spread within
a culture [12]. In Internet vernacular, a meme usually refers
to variants of a particular image, video, cliche´, etc. that share
a common theme and are disseminated by a large number of
users. In this paper, we focus on their most common incarna-
tion: static images.
To gain an understanding of how memes propagate across
the Web, with a particular focus on discovering the communi-
ties that are most influential in spreading them, our intuition
is to build clusters of visually similar images, allowing us to
track variants of a meme. We then group clusters that belong
to the same meme to study and track the meme itself. In Fig-
ure 1, we provide a visual representation of the Smug Frog
1https://github.com/memespaper/memes pipeline
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Figure 1: An example of a meme (Smug Frog) that provides an intu-
ition of what an image, a cluster, and a meme is.
meme [52], which includes many variants of the same image
(a “smug” Pepe the Frog) and several clusters of variants. Clus-
ter 1 has variants from a Jurassic Park scene, where one of the
characters is hiding from two velociraptors behind a kitchen
counter: the frogs are stylized to look similar to velociraptors,
and the character hiding varies to express a particular message.
For example, in the image in the top right corner, the two frogs
are searching for an anti-semitic caricature of a Jew (itself a
meme known as the Happy Merchant [36]). Cluster N shows
variants of the smug frog wearing a Nazi officer military cap
with a photograph of the infamous “Arbeit macht frei” slogan
from the distinctive curved gates of Auschwitz in the back-
ground. In particular, the two variants on the right display the
death’s head logo of the SS-Totenkopfverba¨nde organization
responsible for running the concentration camps during World
War II. Overall, these clusters represent the branching nature
of memes: as a new variant of a meme becomes prevalent, it
often branches into its own sub-meme, potentially incorporat-
ing imagery from other memes.
2.2 Processing Pipeline
Our processing pipeline is depicted in Figure 2. As dis-
cussed above, our methodology aims at identifying clusters of
similar images and assign them to higher level groups, which
are the actual memes. Note that the proposed pipeline is not
limited to image macros and can be used to identify any image.
We first discuss the types of data sources needed for our ap-
proach, i.e., meme annotation sites and Web communities that
post memes (dotted rounded rectangles in the figure). Then,
we describe each of the operations performed by our pipeline
(Steps 1-7, see regular rectangles).
Data Sources. Our pipeline uses two types of data sources:
1) sites providing meme annotation and 2) Web communi-
ties that disseminate memes. In this paper, we use Know Your
Meme for the former, and Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab for
the latter. We provide more details about our datasets in Sec-
tion 3. Note that our methodology supports any annotation site
and any Web community, and this is why we add the “Generic”
sites/communities notation in Figure 2.
pHash Extraction (Step 1). We use the Perceptual Hash-
ing (pHash) algorithm [65] to calculate a fingerprint of
each image in such a way that any two images that look
similar to the human eye map to a “similar” hash value.
pHash generates a feature vector of 64 elements that de-
scribe an image, computed from the Discrete Cosine Trans-
form among the different frequency domains of the im-
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Figure 2: High-level overview of our processing pipeline.
age. Thus, visually similar images have minor differences in
their vectors, hence allowing to search for and detect visu-
ally similar images. For example, the string representation
of the pHashes obtained from the images in cluster N (see
Figure 1) are 55352b0b8d8b5b53, 55952b0bb58b5353, and
55952b2b9da58a53, respectively. The algorithm is also robust
against changes in the images, e.g., signal processing opera-
tions and direct manipulation [87], and effectively reduces the
dimensionality of the raw images.
Clustering via pairwise distance calculation (Steps 2-3).
Next, we cluster images from one or more Web Communities
using the pHash values. We perform a pairwise comparison of
all the pHashes using Hamming distance (Step 2). To support
large numbers of images, we implement a highly paralleliz-
able system on top of TensorFlow [3], which uses multiple
GPUs to enhance performance. Images are clustered using a
density-based algorithm (Step 3). Our current implementation
uses DBSCAN [15], mainly because it can discover clusters of
arbitrary shape and performs well over large, noisy datasets.
Nonetheless, our architecture can be easily tweaked to support
any clustering algorithm and distance metric.
We also perform an analysis of the clustering performance
and the rationale for selecting the clustering threshold. We re-
fer to Appendix A for more details.
Screenshots Removal (Step 4). Meme annotation sites like
KYM often include, in their image galleries, screenshots of so-
cial network posts that are not variants of a meme but just com-
ments about it. Hence, we discard social-network screenshots
from the annotation sites data sources using a deep learning
classifier. We refer to Appendix C for details about the model
and the training dataset.
Cluster Annotation (Steps 5). Clustering annotation uses the
medoid of each cluster, i.e., the element with the minimum
square average distance from all images in the cluster. In other
words, the medoid is the image that best represents the clus-
ter. The clusters’ medoids are compared with all images from
meme annotation sites, by calculating the Hamming distance
between each pair of pHash vectors. We consider that an im-
age matches a cluster if the distance is less than or equal to
a threshold θ, which we set to 8, as it allows us to capture
the diversity of images that are part of the same meme while
maintaining a low number of false positives.
As the annotation process considers all the images of a
KYM entry’s image gallery, it is likely we will get multiple an-
notations for a single cluster. To find the representative KYM
entry for each cluster, we select the one with the largest pro-
portion of matches of KYM images with the cluster medoid.
In case of ties, we select the one with the minimum average
Hamming distance.
As KYM is based on community contributions it is unclear
how good our annotations are. To evaluate KYM entries and
our cluster annotations, three authors of this paper assessed
200 annotated clusters and 162 KYM entries. We find that only
1.85% of the assessed KYM entries were regarded as “bad”
or not sufficient. When it comes to the clustering annotation,
we note that the three annotators had substantial agreement
(Fleis agreement score equal to 0.67) and that the clustering
accuracy, after majority agreement, of the assessed clusters is
89% . We refer to Appendix B for details about the annotation
process and results.
Association of images to memes (Step 6). To associate im-
ages posted on Web communities (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, etc.)
to memes, we compare them with the clusters’ medoids, us-
ing the same threshold θ. This is conceptually similar to Step
5, but uses images from Web communities instead of images
from annotation sites. This lets us identify memes posted in
generic Web communities and collect relevant metadata from
the posts (e.g., the timestamp of a tweet). Note that we track
the propagation of memes in generic Web communities (e.g.,
Twitter) using a seed of memes obtained by clustering im-
ages from other (fringe) Web communities. More specifically,
our seeds will be memes generated on three fringe Web com-
munities (/pol/, The Donald subreddit, Gab); nonetheless, our
methodology can be applied to any community.
Analysis and Influence Estimation (Step 7). We analyze all
relevant clusters and the occurrences of memes, aiming to
assess: 1) their popularity and diversity in each community;
2) their temporal evolution; and 3) how communities influence
each other with respect to meme dissemination.
2.3 Distance Metric
To better understand the interplay and connections between
the clusters, we introduce a custom distance metric, which re-
lies on both the visual peculiarities of the images (via pHash)
and data available from annotation sites. The distance metric
supports one of two modes: 1) one for when both clusters are
annotated (full-mode), and 2) another for when one or none of
the clusters is annotated (partial-mode).
Definition. Let c be a cluster of images and F a set of fea-
tures extracted from the clusters. The custom distance metric
between cluster ci and cj is defined as:
distance(ci, cj) = 1−
∑
f∈F
wf × rf(ci, cj) (1)
where rf(ci, cj) denotes the similarity between the features
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Figure 3: Different values of rperceptual (y-axis) for all possible in-
puts of d (x-axis) with respect to the smoother τ .
of type f ∈ F of cluster ci and cj , and wf is a weight that
represents the relevance of each feature. Note that
∑
f wf = 1
and rf (ci, cj) = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. Thus, distance(ci, cj)
is a number between 0 and 1.
Features. We consider four different features for rf∈F, specif-
ically, F = {perceptual,meme, people, culture}; see below.
rperceptual: this feature is the similarity between two clusters
from a perceptual viewpoint. Let h be a pHash vector for an
image m in cluster c, where m is the medoid of the cluster,
and dij the Hamming distance between vectors hi and hj (see
Step 5 in Section 2.2). We compute dij from ci and cj as fol-
lows. First, we obtain obtain the medoid mi from cluster ci.
Subsequently, we obtain hi=pHash(mi). Finally, we compute
dij=Hamming(hi, hj). We simplify notation and use d instead
of dij to denote the distance between two medoid images and
refer to this distance as the Hamming score.
We define the perceptual similarity between two clusters as
an exponential decay function over the Hamming score d:
rperceptual(d) = 1− d
τ × emax/τ (2)
where max represents the maximum pHash distance between
two images and τ is a constant parameter, or smoother, that
controls how fast the exponential function decays for all val-
ues of d (recall that {d ∈ R | 0 ≤ d ≤ max}). Note
that max is bound to the precision given by the pHash al-
gorithm. Recall that each pHash has a size of |d|=64, hence
max=64. Intuitively, when τ << 64, rperceptual is a high
value only with perceptually indistinguishable images, e.g., for
τ=1, two images with d=0 have a similarity rperceptual=1.0.
With the same τ , the similarity drops to 0.4 when d=1. By
contrast, when τ is close to 64, rperceptual decays almost
linearly. For example, for τ=64, rperceptual(d=0)=1.0 and
rperceptual(d=1)=0.98. Figure 3 shows how rperceptual per-
forms for different values of τ . As mentioned above, we ob-
serve that pairs of images with scores between d=0 and d=8
are usually part of the same variant (see Step 5 in Section 2.2).
In our implementation, we set τ=25 as rperceptual returns high
values up to d=8, and rapidly decays thereafter.
rmeme, rculture, and rpeople: the annotation process (Step 5)
provides contextualized information about the cluster medoid,
including the name (i.e., the main identifier) given to a meme,
the associated culture (i.e., high-level group of meme), and
people that are included in a meme. Note that we use all the
annotations for each category and not only the representative
one (see Step 5). Therefore, we model a different similarity
for each of the these categories, by looking at the overlap of
all the annotations among the medoids of both clusters (mi,
mj , for ci and cj , respectively). Specifically, for each cate-
gory, we calculate the Jaccard index between the annotations
of both medoids, for memes, cultures, and people, thus acquir-
ing rmeme, rculture, rpeople, respectively.
Modes. Our distance metric measures how similar two clusters
are. If both clusters are annotated, we operate in “full-mode,”
and in “partial-mode” otherwise. For each mode, we use dif-
ferent weights for the features in Eq. 1, which we set empiri-
cally as we lack the ground-truth data needed to automate the
computation of the optimal set of thresholds.
Full-mode. In full-mode, we set weights as follows. 1) The
features from the perceptual and meme categories should have
higher relevance than people and culture, as they are intrin-
sically related to the definition of meme (see Section 2.1).
The last two are non-discriminant features, yet are informative
and should contribute to the metric. Also, 2) rmeme should
not outweigh rperceptual because of the relevance that visual
similarities have on the different variants of a meme. Like-
wise, rperceptual should not dominate over rmeme because
of the branching nature of the memes. Thus, we want these
two categories to play an equally important weight. There-
fore, we choose wperceptual=0.4, wmeme=0.4, wpeople=0.1,
wculture=0.1.
This means that when two clusters belong to the same meme
and their medoids are perceptually similar, the distance be-
tween the clusters will be small. In fact, it will be at most
0.2 = 1 − (0.4 + 0.4) if people and culture do not match,
and 0.0 if they also match. Note that our metric also assigns
small distance values for the following two cases: 1) when two
clusters are part of the same meme variant, and 2) when two
clusters use the same image for different memes.
Partial-mode. In this mode, we associate unannotated images
with any of the known clusters. This is a critical component of
our analysis (Step 6), allowing us to study images from generic
Web communities where annotations are unavailable. In this
case, we rely entirely on the perceptual features. We once again
use Eq. 1, but simply set all weights to 0, except forwperceptual
(which is set to 1). That is, we compare the image we want
to test with the medoid of the cluster and we apply Eq. 2 as
described above.
3 Datasets
We now present the datasets used in our measurements.
3.1 Web Communities
As mentioned earlier, our data sources are Web communities
that post memes and meme annotation sites. For the former, we
focus on four communities: Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and 4chan
(more precisely, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board, /pol/).
This provides a mix of mainstream social networks (Twitter
and Reddit) as well as fringe communities that are often asso-
ciated with the alt-right and have an impact on the information
ecosystem (Gab and /pol/) [86].
There are several other platforms playing important roles
in spreading memes, however, many are “closed” (e.g., Face-
book) or do not involve memes based on static images (e.g.,
4
Platform #Posts #Posts with #Images #Unique
Images pHashes
Twitter 1,469,582,378 242,723,732 114,459,736 74,234,065
Reddit 1,081,701,536 62,321,628 40,523,275 30,441,325
/pol/ 48,725,043 13,190,390 4,325,648 3,626,184
Gab 12,395,575 955,440 235,222 193,783
KYM 15,584 15,584 706,940 597,060
Table 1: Overview of our datasets.
YouTube, Giphy). In future work, we plan to extend our mea-
surements to communities like Instagram and Tumblr, as well
as to GIF and video memes. Nonetheless, we believe our data
sources already allow us to elicit comprehensive insights into
the meme ecosystem.
Table 1 reports the number of posts and images processed
for each community. Note that the number of images is lower
than the number of posts with images because of duplicate im-
age URLs and because some images get deleted. Next, we dis-
cuss each dataset.
Twitter. Twitter is a mainstream microblogging platform, al-
lowing users to broadcast 280-character messages (tweets) to
their followers. Our Twitter dataset is based on tweets made
available via the 1% Streaming API, between July 1, 2016 and
July 31, 2017. In total, we parse 1.4B tweets: 242M of them
have at least one image. We extract all the images, ultimately
collecting 114M images yielding 74M unique pHashes.
Reddit. Reddit is a news aggregator: users create submissions
by posting a URL and others can reply in a structured way. It is
divided into multiple sub-communities called subreddits, each
with its own topic and moderation policy. Content popularity
and ranking are determined via a voting system based on the
up- and down-votes that users cast. We gather images from
Reddit using publicly available data from Pushshift [68]. We
parse all submissions and comments2 between July 1, 2016
and July, 31 2017, and extract 62M posts that contain at least
one image. We then download 40M images producing 30M
unique pHashes.
4chan. 4chan is an anonymous image board; users create new
threads by posting an image with some text, which others can
reply to. It lacks many of the traditional social networking fea-
tures like sharing or liking content, but has two characteristic
features: anonymity and ephemerality. By default, user iden-
tities are concealed and messages by the same users are not
linkable across threads, and all threads are deleted after one
week. Overall, 4chan is known for its extremely lax moder-
ation and the high degree of hate and racism, especially on
boards like /pol/ [22]. We obtain all threads posted on /pol/, be-
tween July 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017, using the same method-
ology of [22]. Since all threads (and images) are removed after
a week, we use a public archive service called 4plebs [2] to
collect 4.3M images, thus yielding 3.6M unique pHashes.
Gab. Gab is a social network launched in August 2016 as
a “champion” of free speech, providing “shelter” to users
banned from other platforms. It combines social networking
2See [70] for metadata associated with submissions and comments.
features from Twitter (broadcast of 300-character messages)
and Reddit (content is ranked according to up- and down-
votes). It also has extremely lax moderation as it allows ev-
erything except illegal pornography, terrorist propaganda, and
doxing [77]. Overall, Gab attracts alt-right users, conspiracy
theorists, and trolls, and high volumes of hate speech [85]. We
collect 12M posts, posted on Gab between August 10, 2016
and July 31, 2017, and 955K posts have at least one image, us-
ing the same methodology as in [85]. Out of these, 235K im-
ages are unique, producing 193K unique pHashes. Note that
our Gab dataset starts one month later than the other ones,
since Gab was launched in August 2016.
Ethics. Although we only collect publicly available data, our
study has been approved by the designated ethics officer at
UCL. Since 4chan content is typically posted with expecta-
tions of anonymity, we note that we have followed standard
ethical guidelines [71] and encrypted data at rest, while mak-
ing no attempt to de-anonymize users.
3.2 Meme Annotation Site
Know Your Meme (KYM). We choose KYM as the source
for meme annotation as it offers a comprehensive database of
memes. KYM is a sort of encyclopedia of Internet memes: for
each meme, it provides information such as its origin (i.e., the
platform on which it was first observed), the year it started,
as well as descriptions and examples. In addition, for each
entry, KYM provides a set of keywords, called tags, that de-
scribe the entry. Also, KYM provides a variety of higher-level
categories that group meme entries; namely, cultures, subcul-
tures, people, events, and sites. “Cultures” and “subcultures”
entries refer to a wide variety of topics ranging from video
games to various general categories. For example, the Rage
Comics subculture [47] is a higher level category associated
with memes related to comics like Rage Guy [48] or LOL
Guy [38], while the Alt-right culture [24] gathers entries from
a loosely defined segment of the right-wing community. The
rest of the categories refer to specific individuals (e.g., Donald
Trump [31]), specific events (e.g.,#CNNBlackmail [29]), and
sites (e.g., /pol/ [46]), respectively. It is also worth noting that
KYM moderates all entries, hence entries that are wrong or
incomplete are marked as so by the site.
As of May 2018, the site has 18.3K entries, specifically, 14K
memes, 1.3K subcultures, 1.2K people, 1.3K events, and 427
websites [39]. We crawl KYM between October and Decem-
ber 2017, acquiring data for 15.6K entries; for each entry, we
also download all the images related to it by crawling all the
pages of the image gallery. In total, we collect 707K images
corresponding to 597K unique pHashes. Note that we obtain
15.6K out of 18.3K entries, as we crawled the site several
months before May 2018.
Getting to know KYM. We also perform a general character-
ization of KYM. First, we look at the distribution of entries
across categories: as shown in Figure 4(a), as expected, the
majority (57%) are memes, followed by subcultures (30%),
cultures (3%), websites (2%), and people (2%).
Next, we measure the number of images per entry: as shown
in Figure 4(b), this varies considerably (note log-scale on x-
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Figure 4: Basic statistics of the KYM dataset.
axis). KYM entries have as few as 1 and as many as 8K images,
with an average of 45 and a median of 9 images. Larger values
may be related to the meme’s popularity, but also to the “di-
versity” of image variants it generates. Upon manual inspec-
tion, we find that the presence of a large number of images for
the same meme happens either when images are visually very
similar to each other (e.g., Smug Frog images within the two
clusters in Figure 1), or if there are actually remarkably differ-
ent variants of the same meme (e.g., images in ‘cluster 1’ vs.
images in ‘cluster N’ in the same figure). We also note that the
distribution varies according to the category: e.g., higher-level
concepts like cultures include more images than more specific
entries like memes.
We then analyze the origin of each entry: see Figure 4(c).
Note that a large portion of the memes (28%) have an un-
known origin, while YouTube, 4chan, and Twitter are the most
popular platforms with, respectively, 21%, 12%, and 11%, fol-
lowed by Tumblr and Reddit with 8% and 7%. This confirms
our intuition that 4chan, Twitter, and Reddit, which are among
our data sources, play an important role in the generation and
dissemination of memes. As mentioned, we do not currently
study video memes originating from YouTube, due to the in-
herent complexity of video-processing tasks as well as scala-
bility issues. However, a large portion of YouTube memes ac-
tually end up being morphed into image-based memes (see,
e.g., the Overly Attached Girlfriend meme [44]).
3.3 Running the pipeline on our datasets
For all four Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and
Gab), we perform Step 1 of the pipeline (Figure 2), using the
ImageHash library.3After computing the pHashes, we delete
the images (i.e., we only keep the associated URL and pHash)
due to space limitations of our infrastructure. We then perform
Steps 2-3 (i.e., pairwise comparisons between all images and
clustering), for all the images from /pol/, The Donald subred-
dit, and Gab, as we treat them as fringe Web communities.
Note that, we exclude mainstream communities like the rest
of Reddit and Twitter as our main goal is to obtain clusters of
memes from fringe Web communities and later characterize
all communities by means of the clusters. Next, we go through
Steps 4-5 using all the images obtained from meme annotation
websites (specifically, Know Your Meme, see Section 3.2) and
the medoid of each cluster from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab.
3https://github.com/JohannesBuchner/imagehash
Platform #Images Noise #Clusters #Clusters with
KYM tags (%)
/pol/ 4,325,648 63% 38,851 9,265 (24%)
T D 1,234,940 64% 21,917 2,902 (13%)
Gab 235,222 69% 3,083 447 (15%)
Table 2: Statistics obtained from clustering images from /pol/,
The Donald, and Gab.
Finally, Steps 6-7 use all the pHashes obtained from Twitter,
Reddit (all subreddits), /pol/, and Gab to find posts with images
matching the annotated clusters. This is an integral part of our
process as it allows to characterize and study mainstream Web
communities not used for clustering (i.e., Twitter and Reddit).
4 Analysis
In this section, we present a cluster-based measurement of
memes and an analysis of a few Web communities from the
“perspective” of memes. We measure the prevalence of memes
across the clusters obtained from fringe communities: /pol/,
The Donald subreddit (T D), and Gab. We also use the dis-
tance metric introduced in Eq. 1 to perform a cross-community
analysis, then, we group clusters into broad, but related, cat-
egories to gain a macro-perspective understanding of larger
communities, including Reddit and Twitter.
4.1 Cluster-based Analysis
We start by analyzing the 12.6K annotated clusters consist-
ing of 268K images from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab (Step 5
in Figure 2). We do so to understand the diversity of memes in
each Web community, as well as the interplay between vari-
ants of memes. We then evaluate how clusters can be grouped
into higher structures using hierarchical clustering and graph
visualization techniques.
4.1.1 Clusters
Statistics. In Table 2, we report some basic statistics of the
clusters obtained for each Web community. A relatively high
percentage of images (63%–69%) are not clustered, i.e., are la-
beled as noise. While in DBSCAN “noise” is just an instance
that does not fit in any cluster (more specifically, there are less
than 5 images with perceptual distance ≤ 8 from that particu-
lar instance), we note that this likely happens as these images
are not memes, but rather “one-off images.” For example, on
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Figure 5: CDF of KYM entries per cluster (a) and clusters per KYM entry (b).
/pol/ there is a large number of pictures of random people taken
from various social media platforms.
Overall, we have 2.1M images in 63.9K clusters: 38K clus-
ters for /pol/, 21K for The Donald, and 3K for Gab. 12.6K of
these clusters are successfully annotated using the KYM data:
9.2K from /pol/ (142K images), 2.9K from The Donald (121K
images), and 447 from Gab (4.5K images). Examples of clus-
ters are reported in Appendix D. As for the un-annotated clus-
ters, manual inspection confirms that many include miscella-
neous images unrelated to memes, e.g., similar screenshots of
social networks posts (recall that we only filter out screenshots
from the KYM image galleries), images captured from video
games, etc.
KYM entries per cluster. Each cluster may receive multiple
annotations, depending on the KYM entries that have at least
one image matching that cluster’s medoid. As shown in Fig-
ure 5(a), the majority of the annotated clusters (74% for /pol/,
70% for The Donald, and 58% for Gab) only have a single
matching KYM entry. However, a few clusters have a large
number of matching entries, e.g., the one matching the Con-
spiracy Keanu meme [30] is annotated by 126 KYM entries
(primarily, other memes that add text in an image associated
with that meme). This highlights that memes do overlap and
that some are highly influenced by other ones.
Clusters per KYM entry. We also look at the number of clus-
ters annotated by the same KYM entry. Figure 5(b) plots the
CDF of the number of clusters per entry. About 40% only an-
notate a single /pol/ cluster, while 34% and 20% of the entries
annotate a single The Donald and a single Gab cluster, respec-
tively. We also find that a small number of entries are asso-
ciated to a large number of clusters: for example, the Happy
Merchant meme [36] annotates 124 different clusters on /pol/.
This highlights the diverse nature of memes, i.e., memes are
mixed and matched, not unlike the way that genetic traits are
combined in biological reproduction.
Top KYM entries. Because the majority of clusters match
only one or two KYM entries (Figure 5(a)), we simplify things
by giving all clusters a representative annotation based on the
most prevalent annotation given to the medoid, and, in the
case of ties the average distance between all matches (see Sec-
tion 2.2). Thus, in the rest of the paper, we report our findings
based on the representative annotation for each cluster.
In Table 3, we report the top 20 KYM entries with respect
to the number of clusters they annotate. These cover 17%,
23%, and 27% of the clusters in /pol/, The Donald, and Gab,
respectively, hence covering a relatively good sample of our
datasets. Donald Trump [31], Smug Frog [52], and Pepe the
Frog [45] appear in the top 20 for all three communities, while
the Happy Merchant [36] only in /pol/ and Gab. In particu-
lar, Donald Trump annotates the most clusters (207 in /pol/,
177 in The Donald, and 25 in Gab). In fact, politics-related
entries appear several times in the Table, e.g., Make America
Great Again [40] as well as political personalities like Bernie
Sanders, Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin, and Hillary Clinton.
When comparing the different communities, we observe the
most prevalent categories are memes (6 to 14 entries in each
community) and people (2-5). Moreover, in /pol/, the 2nd most
popular entry, related to people, is Adolf Hilter, which supports
previous reports of the community’s sympathetic views toward
Nazi ideology [22]. Overall, there are several memes with
hateful or disturbing content (e.g., holocaust). This happens
to a lesser extent in The Donald and Gab: the most popular
people after Donald Trump are contemporary politicians, i.e.,
Bernie Sanders, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, and Hillary
Clinton.
Finally, image posting behavior in fringe Web communi-
ties is greatly influenced by real-world events. For instance,
in /pol/, we find the #TrumpAnime controversy event [55],
where a political individual (Rick Wilson) offended the alt-
right community, Donald Trump supporters, and anime fans
(an oddly intersecting set of interests of /pol/ users). Simi-
larly, on The Donald and Gab, we find the #Cnnblackmail [29]
event, referring to the (alleged) blackmail of the Reddit user
that created the infamous video of Donald Trump wrestling
the CNN.
4.1.2 Memes’ Branching Nature
Next, we study how memes evolve by looking at variants
across different clusters. Intuitively, clusters that look alike
and/or are part of the same meme are grouped together under
the same branch of an evolutionary tree. We use the custom
distance metric introduced in Section 2.3, aiming to infer the
phylogenetic relationship between variants of memes. Since
there are 12.6K annotated clusters, we only report on a subset
of variants. In particular, we focus on “frog” memes (e.g., Pepe
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/pol/ T D Gab
Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%)
Donald Trump People 207 (2.2%) Donald Trump People 177 (6.1%) Donald Trump People 25 (5.6%)
Happy Merchant Memes 124 (1.3%) Smug Frog Memes 78 (2.7%) Happy Merchant Memes 10 (2.2%)
Smug Frog Memes 114 (1.2%) Pepe the Frog Memes 63 (2.1%) Demotivational Posters Memes 7 (1.5%)
Computer Reaction Faces Memes 112 (1.2%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 61 (2.1%) Pepe the Frog Memes 6 (1.3%)
Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 94 (1.0%) Make America Great Again Memes 50 (1.7%) #Cnnblackmail Events 6 (1.3%)
I Know that Feel Bro Memes 90 (1.0%) Bernie Sanders People 31 (1.0%) 2016 US election Events 6 (1.3%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why Memes 89 (1.0%) 2016 US Election Events 27 (0.9%) Know Your Meme Sites 6 (1.3%)
Bait/This is Bait Memes 84 (0.9%) Counter Signal Memes Memes 24 (0.8%) Tumblr Sites 6 (1.3%)
#TrumpAnime/Rick Wilson Events 76 (0.8%) #Cnnblackmail Events 24 (0.8%) Feminism Cultures 5 (1.1%)
Reaction Images Memes 73 (0.8%) Know Your Meme Sites 20 (0.7%) Barack Obama People 5 (1.1%)
Make America Great Again Memes 72 (0.8%) Angry Pepe Memes 18 (0.6%) Smug Frog Memes 5 (1.1%)
Counter Signal Memes Memes 72 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters Memes 18 (0.6%) rwby Subcultures 5 (1.1%)
Pepe the Frog Memes 65 (0.7%) 4chan Sites 16 (0.5%) Kim Jong Un People 5 (1.1%)
Spongebob Squarepants Subcultures 61 (0.7%) Tumblr Sites 15 (0.5%) Murica Memes 5 (1.1%)
Doom Paul its Happening Memes 57 (0.6%) Gamergate Events 15 (0.5%) UA Passenger Removal Events 5 (1.1%)
Adolf Hitler People 56 (0.6%) Colbertposting Memes 15 (0.5%) Make America Great Again Memes 4 (0.9%)
pol Sites 53 (0.6%) Donald Trump’s Wall Memes 15 (0.5%) Bill Nye People 4 (0.9%)
Dubs Guy/Check’em Memes 53 (0.6%) Vladimir Putin People 15 (0.5%) Trolling Cultures 4 (0.9%)
Smug Anime Face Memes 51 (0.6%) Barack Obama People 15 (0.5%) 4chan Sites 4 (0.9%)
Warhammer 40000 Subcultures 51 (0.6%) Hillary Clinton People 15 (0.5%) Furries Cultures 3 (0.7%)
Total 1,638 (17.7%) 695 (23.9%) 121 (27.1%)
Table 3: Top 20 KYM entries appearing in the clusters of /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. We report the number of clusters and their respective
percentage (per community). Each item contains a hyperlink to the corresponding entry on the KYM website.
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Figure 6: Inter-cluster distance between all clusters with frog memes. Clusters are labeled with the origin (4 for 4chan, D for The Donald, and
G for Gab) and the meme name. To ease readability, we do not display all labels, abbreviate meme names, and only show an excerpt of all
relationships.
the Frog [45]); as discussed later in Section 4.2, this is one of
the most popular memes in our datasets.
The dendrogram in Figure 6 shows the hierarchical rela-
tionship between groups of clusters of memes related to frogs.
Overall, there are 525 clusters of frogs, belonging to 23 differ-
ent memes. These clusters can be grouped into four large cat-
egories, dominated by Apu Apustaja [26], Feels Bad Man/Sad
Frog [34], Pepe the Frog [45], and Smug Frog [52]. The dif-
ferent memes express different ideas or messages: e.g., Apu
Apustaja depicts a simple-minded non-native speaker using
broken English, while the Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog (ironically)
expresses dismay at a given situation, often accompanied with
text like “You will never do/be/have X.” The dendrogram also
shows a variant of Smug Frog (smug-frog-b) related to a vari-
ant of the Russian Anti Meme Law [51] (anti-meme) as well
as relationships between clusters from Pepe the Frog and Isis
meme [37], and between Smug Frog and Brexit-related clus-
ters [56], as shown in Appendix E.
The distance metric quantifies the similarity of any two vari-
ants of different memes; however, recall that two clusters can
be close to each other even when the medoids are perceptu-
ally different (see Section 2.3), as in the case of Smug Frog
variants in the smug-frog-a and smug-frog-b clusters (top of
Figure 6). Although, due to space constraints, this analysis is
limited to a single “family” of memes, our distance metric can
actually provide useful insights regarding the phylogenetic re-
lationships of any clusters. In fact, more extensive analysis of
these relationships (through our pipeline) can facilitate the un-
derstanding of the diffusion of ideas and information across the
Web, and provide a rigorous technique for large-scale analysis
of Internet culture.
4.1.3 Meme Visualization
We also use the custom distance metric (see Eq. 1) to vi-
sualize the clusters with annotations. We build a graph G =
(V ,E), where V are the medoids of annotated clusters andE
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Figure 7: Visualization of the obtained clusters from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. Note that memes with red labels are annotated as racist,
while memes with green labels are annotated as politics (see Section 4.2.1 for the selection criteria).
the connections between medoids with distance under a thresh-
old κ. Figure 7 shows a snapshot of the graph for κ = 0.45,
chosen based on the frogs analysis above (see red horizontal
line in Figure 6). In particular, we select this threshold as the
majority of the clusters from the same meme (note coloration
in Figure 6) are hierarchically connected with a higher-level
cluster at a distance close to 0.45. To ease readability, we filter
out nodes and edges that have a sum of in- and out-degree less
than 10, which leaves 40% of the nodes and 92% of the edges.
Nodes are colored according to their KYM annotation. NB:
the graph is laid out using the OpenOrd algorithm [63] and the
distance between the components in it does not exactly match
the actual distance metric. We observe a large set of discon-
nected components, with each component containing nodes of
primarily one color. This indicates that our distance metric is
indeed capturing the peculiarities of different memes. Finally,
note that an interactive version of the full graph is publicly
available from [1].
4.2 Web Community-based Analysis
We now present a macro-perspective analysis of the Web
communities through the lens of memes. We assess the pres-
ence of different memes in each community, how popular they
are, and how they evolve. To this end, we examine the posts
from all four communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab)
that contain images matching memes from fringe Web com-
munities (/pol/, The Donald, and Gab).
4.2.1 Meme Popularity
Memes. We start by analyzing clusters grouped by KYM
‘meme’ entries, looking at the number of posts for each meme
in /pol/, Reddit, Gab, and Twitter.
In Table 4, we report the top 20 memes for each Web com-
munity sorted by the number of posts. We observe that Pepe
the Frog [45] and its variants are among the most popular
memes for every platform. While this might be an artifact of
using fringe communities as a “seed” for the clustering, re-
call that the goal of this work is in fact to gain an understand-
ing of how fringe communities disseminate memes and influ-
ence mainstream ones. Thus, we leave to future work a broader
analysis of the wider meme ecosystem.
Sad Frog [34] is the most popular meme on /pol/ (4.9%),
the 3rd on Reddit (1.3%), the 10th on Gab (0.8%), and the
12th on Twitter (0.5%). We also find variations like Smug
Frog [52], Apu Apustaja [26], Pepe the Frog [45], and Angry
Pepe [25]. Considering that Pepe is treated as a hate symbol
by the Anti-Defamation League [58] and that is often used in
hateful or racist, this likely indicates that polarized commu-
nities like /pol/ and Gab do use memes to incite hateful con-
versation. This is also evident from the popularity of the anti-
semitic Happy Merchant meme [36], which depicts a “greedy”
and “manipulative” stereotypical caricature of a Jew (3.8% on
/pol/ and 1.1% on Gab).
By contrast, mainstream communities like Reddit and Twit-
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog 64,367 (4.9%) Manning Face 12,540 (2.2%) Jesusland (P) 454 (1.6%) Roll Safe 55,010 (5.9%)
Smug Frog 63,290 (4.8%) That’s the Joke 7,626 (1.3%) Demotivational Posters 414 (1.5%) Evil Kermit 50,642 (5.4%)
Happy Merchant (R) 49,608 (3.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 7,240 (1.3%) Smug Frog 392 (1.4%) Arthur’s Fist 37,591 (4.0%)
Apu Apustaja 29,756 (2.2%) Confession Bear 7,147 (1.3%) Based Stickman (P) 391 (1.4%) Nut Button 13,598 (1,5%)
Pepe the Frog 25,197 (1.9%) This is Fine 5,032 (0.9%) Pepe the Frog 378 (1.3%) Spongebob Mock 11,136 (1,2%)
Make America Great Again (P) 21,229 (1.6%) Smug Frog 4,642 (0.8%) Happy Merchant (R) 297 (1.1%) Reaction Images 9,387 (1.0%)
Angry Pepe 20,485 (1.5%) Roll Safe 4,523 (0.8%) Murica 274 (1.0%) Conceited Reaction 9,106 (1.0%)
Bait this is Bait 16,686 (1.2%) Rage Guy 4,491 (0.8%) And Its Gone 235 (0.9%) Expanding Brain 8,701 (0.9%)
I Know that Feel Bro 14,490 (1.1%) Make America Great Again (P) 4,440 (0.8%) Make America Great Again (P) 207 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters 7,781 (0.8%)
Cult of Kek 14,428 (1.1%) Fake CCG Cards 4,438 (0.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 206 (0.8%) Cash Me Ousside/Howbow Dah 5,972 (0.6%)
Laughing Tom Cruise 14,312 (1.1%) Confused Nick Young 4,024 (0.7%) Trump’s First Order of Business (P) 192 (0.7%) Salt Bae 5,375 (0.6%)
Awoo 13,767 (1.0%) Daily Struggle 4,015 (0.7%) Kekistan 186 (0.6%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 4,991 (0.5%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why 13,577 (1.0%) Expanding Brain 3,757 (0.7%) Picardia (P) 183 (0.6%) Math Lady/Confused Lady 4,722 (0.5%)
Picardia (P) 13,540 (1.0%) Demotivational Posters 3,419 (0.6%) Things with Faces (Pareidolia) 156 (0.5%) Computer Reaction Faces 4,720 (0.5%)
Big Grin / Never Ever 12,893 (1.0%) Actual Advice Mallard 3,293 (0.6%) Serbia Strong/Remove Kebab 149 (0.5%) Clinton Trump Duet (P) 3,901 (0.4%)
Reaction Images 12,608 (0.9%) Reaction Images 2,959 (0.5%) Riot Hipster 148 (0.5%) Kendrick Lamar Damn Album Cover 3,656 (0.4%)
Computer Reaction Faces 12,247 (0.9%) Handsome Face 2,675 (0.5%) Colorized History 144 (0.5%) What in tarnation 3,363 (0.3%)
Wojak / Feels Guy 11,682 (0.9%) Absolutely Disgusting 2,674 (0.5%) Most Interesting Man in World 140 (0.5%) Harambe the Gorilla 3,164 (0.3%)
Absolutely Disgusting 11,436 (0.8%) Pepe the Frog 2,672 (0.5%) Chuck Norris Facts 131 (0.4%) I Know that Feel Bro 3,137 (0.3%)
Spurdo Sparde 9,581 (0.7%) Pretending to be Retarded 2,462 (0.4%) Roll Safe 131 (0.4%) This is Fine 3,094 (0.3%)
Total 445,179 (33.4%) 94,069 (16.7%) 4,808 (17.0%) 249,047 (26.4%)
Table 4: Top 20 KYM entries for memes that we find our datasets. We report the number of posts for each meme as well as the percentage over
all the posts (per community) that contain images that match one of the annotated clusters. The (R) and (P) markers indicate whether a meme
is annotated as racist or politics-related, respectively (see Section 4.2.1 for the selection criteria).
ter primarily share harmless/neutral memes, which are rarely
used in hateful contexts. Specifically, on Reddit the top memes
are Manning Face [41] (2.2%) and That’s the Joke [53] (1.3%),
while on Twitter the top ones are Roll Safe [50] (5.9%) and
Evil Kermit [33] (5.4%).
Once again, we find that users (in all communities) post
memes to share politics-related information, possibly aiming
to enhance or penalize the public image of politicians (see Ap-
pendix E for an example of such memes). For instance, we find
Make America Great Again [40], a meme dedicated to Donald
Trump’s US presidential campaign, among the top memes in
/pol/ (1.6%), in Reddit (0.8%), and Gab (0.8%). Similarly, in
Twitter, we find the Clinton Trump Duet meme [28] (0.4%), a
meme inspired by the 2nd US presidential debate.
People. We also analyze memes related to people (i.e., KYM
entries with the people category). Table 5 reports the top 15
KYM entries in this category. We observe that, in all Web
Communities, the most popular person portrayed in memes
is Donald Trump: he is depicted in 4.6% of /pol/ posts that
contain annotated images, while for Reddit, Gab, and Twitter
the percentages are 6.1%, 6.1%, and 1.3%, respectively. Other
popular personalities, in all platforms, include several politi-
cians. For instance, in /pol/, we find Mike Pence (0.3%), Jeb
Bush (0.3%), Vladimir Putin (0.2%), while, in Reddit, we find
Steve Bannon (0.6%), Chelsea Manning (0.6%), and Bernie
Sanders (0.3%), in Gab, Mitt Romney (1.7%) and Barack
Obama (0.4%), and, in Twitter, Barack Obama (0.6%), Kim
Jong Un (0.5%), and Chelsea Manning (0.4%). This highlights
the fact that users on these communities utilize memes to share
information and opinions about politicians, and possibly try to
either enhance or harm public opinion about them. Finally, we
note the presence of Adolf Hitler memes on all Web Com-
munities, i.e., /pol/ (0.6%), Reddit (0.3%), Gab (0.4%), and
Twitter (0.2%).
We further group memes into two high-level groups, racist
and politics-related. We use the tags that are available in our
KYM dataset, i.e., we assign a meme to the politics-related
group if it has the “politics,” “2016 us presidential election,”
“presidential election,” “trump,” or “clinton” tags, and to the
racism-related one if the tags include “racism,” “racist,” or “an-
tisemitism,” obtaining 117 racist memes (4.4% of all memes
that appear in our dataset) and 556 politics-related memes
(21.2% of all memes that appear on our dataset). In the rest of
this section, we use these groups to further study the memes,
and later in Section 5 to estimate influence.
4.2.2 Temporal Analysis
Next, we study the temporal aspects of posts that contain
memes from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab. In Figure 8, we
plot the percentage of posts per day that include memes. For all
memes (Figure 8(a)), we observe that /pol/ and Reddit follow
a steady posting behavior, with a peak in activity around the
2016 US elections. We also find that memes are increasingly
more used on Gab (see, e.g., 2016 vs 2017).
As shown in Figure 8(b), both /pol/ and Gab include a sub-
stantially higher number of posts with racist memes, used over
time with a difference in behavior: while /pol/ users share
them in a very steady and constant way, Gab exhibits a bursty
behavior. A possible explanation is that the former is inher-
ently more racist, with the latter primarily reacting to particu-
lar world events. As for political memes (Figure 8(c)), we find
a lot of activity overall on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/, but with
different spikes in time. On Reddit and /pol/, the peaks coin-
cide with the 2016 US elections. On Twitter, we note a peak
that coincides with the 2nd US Presidential Debate on October
2016. For Gab, there is again an increase in posts with political
memes after January 2017.
4.2.3 Score Analysis
As discussed in Section 3.1, Reddit and Gab incorporate a
voting system that determines the popularity of content within
the Web community and essentially captures the appreciation
of other users towards the shared content. To study how users
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Donald Trump 60,611 (4.6%) Donald Trump 34,533 (6.1%) Donald Trump 1,665 (6.1%) Donald Trump 10,208 (1.3%)
Adolf Hitler 8,759 (0.6%) Steve Bannon 3,733 (0.6%) Mitt Romney 455 (1.7%) Barack Obama 5,187 (0.6%)
Mike Pence 4,738 (0.3%) Stephen Colbert 3,121 (0.6%) Bill Nye 370 (1.3%) Chelsea Manning 4,173 (0.5%)
Jeb Bush 4,217 (0.3%) Chelsea Manning 2,261 (0.4%) Adolf Hitler 106 (0.4%) Kim Jong Un 3,271 (0.4%)
Vladimir Putin 3,218 (0.2%) Ben Carson 2,148 (0.4%) Barack Obama 104 (0.4%) Anita Sarkeesian 2,764 (0.3%)
Alex Jones 3,206 (0.2%) Bernie Sanders 1,757 (0.3%) Isis Daesh 92 (0.3%) Bernie Sanders 2,277 (0.3%)
Ron Paul 3,116 (0.2%) Ajit Pai 1,658 (0.3%) Death Grips 91 (0.3%) Vladimir Putin 1,733 (0.2%)
Bernie Sanders 3,022 (0.2%) Barack Obama 1,628 (0.3%) Eminem 89 (0.3%) Billy Mays 1,454 (0.2%)
Massimo D’alema 2,725 (0.2%) Gabe Newell 1,518 (0.3%) Kim Jong Un 87 (0.3%) Adolf Hitler 1,304 (0.2%)
Mitt Romney 2,468 (0.2%) Bill Nye 1,478 (0.3%) Ajit Pai 76 (0.3%) Kanye West 1,261 (0.2%)
Chelsea Manning 2,403 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 1,468 (0.3%) Pewdiepie 73 (0.3%) Bill Nye 968 (0.2%)
Hillary Clinton 2,378 (0.2%) Death Grips 1,463 (0.3%) Bernie Sanders 71 (0.3%) Mitt Romney 923 (0.1%)
A. Wyatt Mann 2,110 (0.2%) Adolf Hitler 1,449 (0.3%) Alex Jones 70 (0.3%) Filthy Frank 777 (0.1%)
Ben Carson 1,780 (0.1%) Mitt Romney 1,294 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 59 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 758 (0.1%)
Filthy Frank 1,598 (0.1%) Eminem 1,274 (0.2%) Anita Sarkeesian 54 (0.2%) Ajit Pai 715 (0.1%)
Table 5: Top 15 KYM entries about people that we find in each of our dataset. We report the number of posts and the percentage over all the
posts (per community) that match a cluster with KYM annotations.
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Figure 8: Percentage of posts per day in our dataset for all, racist, and politics-related memes.
100 101 102 103 104 105
Score
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Politics
Non-Politics
Racism
Non-Racism
All memes
(a) Reddit
100 101 102 103
Score
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Politics
Non-Politics
Racism
Non-Racism
All memes
(b) Gab
Figure 9: CDF of scores of posts that contain memes on Reddit and Gab.
react to racist and politics-related memes, we plot the CDF of
the posts’ scores that contain such memes in Figure 9.
For Reddit (Figure 9(a)), we find that posts that contain
politics-related memes are rated highly (mean score of 224.7
and a median of 5) than posts that contain non-politics memes
(mean 124.9, median 4). On the contrary, posts that contain
racist memes are rated lower (average score of 94.8 and a me-
dian of 3) than other non-racist memes (average 141.6 and
median 4). On Gab (Figure 9(b)), posts that contain politics-
related memes have a similar score as non-political memes
(mean 87.3 vs 82.4). However, this does not apply for racist
and non-racist memes, as non-racist memes have over 2 times
higher scores than racist memes (means 84.7 vs 35.5).
Overall, this suggests that posts that contain politics-related
memes receive high scores by Reddit and Gab users, while for
racist memes this applies only on Reddit.
4.2.4 Sub-Communities
Among all the Web communities that we study, only Red-
dit is divided into multiple sub-communities. We now study
which sub-communities share memes with a focus on racist
and politics-related content. In Table 6, we report the top ten
subreddits in terms of the percentage over all posts that con-
tain memes in Reddit for: 1) all memes; 2) racist ones; and
3) politics-related memes.
For all three groups, the most popular subreddit is
The Donald with 12.5%, 9.3%, and 26.4%, respectively. Inter-
estingly, AdviceAnimals, a general-purpose meme subreddit,
is among the top-ten sub-communities also for racist and po-
litical memes, highlighting their infiltration in otherwise non-
hateful communities.
Other popular subreddits for racist memes include conspir-
acy (2.0%), me irl (1.8%), and funny (1.4%) subreddits. For
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All Memes Racism-Related Memes Politics-Related Memes
Subreddit Posts (%) Subreddit Posts (%) Subreddit Posts (%)
The Donald 82,698 (12.5%) The Donald 359 (9.3%) The Donald 24,343 (26.4%)
AdviceAnimals 35,475 (5.3%) AdviceAnimals 87 (2.2%) politics 2,751 (3.0%)
me irl 15,366 (2.3%) conspiracy 76 (2.0%) EnoughTrumpSpam 2,679 (2.9%)
politics 8,875 (1,3%) me irl 70 (1.8%) TrumpsTweets 2,363 (2.5%)
funny 8,508 (1.3%) funny 56 (1.4%) AdviceAnimals 1,740 (1.9%)
dankmemes 7,744 (1,1%) CringeAnarchy 43 (1.1%) USE2016 1,653 (1.8%)
EnoughTrumpSpam 6,973 (1.1%) EDH 43 (1.1%) PoliticsAll 1,401(1.5%)
pics 5,945 (0.9%) magicTCG 42 (1.1%) dankmemes 881 (0.9%)
AskReddit 5,482 (0.8%) dankmemes 40 (1.0%) pics 877 (0.9%)
HOTandTrending 4,674 (0.7%) ImGoingToHellForThis 39 (1.0%) me irl 873 (0.9%)
Table 6: Top ten subreddits for all memes, racism-related memes, and politics-related memes.
politics-related memes, the majority of the subreddits are re-
lated to Donald Trump, while there also are general subreddits
that talk about politics, e.g., the politics (3.0%) and the Poli-
ticsAll subreddit (1.5%).
4.3 Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways of our analysis include:
1. Fringe Web communities use many variants of memes
related to politics and world events, possibly aiming to
share weaponized information about them (Appendix E
include some examples of such memes). For instance,
Donald Trump is the KYM entry with the largest num-
ber of clusters in /pol/ (2.2%), The Donald (6.1%), and
Gab (2.2%).
2. /pol/ and Gab share hateful and racist memes at a higher
rate than mainstream communities, as we find a consid-
erable number of anti-semitic and pro-Nazi clusters (e.g.,
The Happy Merchant meme [36] appears in 1.3% of all
/pol/ annotated clusters and 2.2% of Gab’s, while Adolf
Hitler in 0.6% of /pol/’s). This trend is steady over time
for /pol/ but ramping up for Gab.
3. Seemingly “neutral” memes, like Pepe the Frog (or one of
its variants), are used in conjunction with other memes to
incite hate or influence public opinion on world events,
e.g., with images related to terrorist organizations like
ISIS or world events such as Brexit.
4. Our custom distance metric successfully allows us to
study the interplay and the overlap of memes, as show-
cased by the visualizations of the clusters and the dendro-
gram (see Figs. 6 and 7).
5. Reddit users are more interested in politics-related
memes than other type of memes. That said, when look-
ing at individual subreddits, we find that The Donald is
the most active one when it comes to posting memes in
general. It is also the subreddit where most racism and
politics-related memes are posted.
5 Influence Estimation
So far we have studied the dissemination of memes by looking
at Web communities in isolation. However, in reality, these in-
fluence each other: e.g., memes posted on one community are
often re-posted to another. Aiming to capture the relationship
between them, we use a statistical model known as Hawkes
Processes [61, 62], which describes how events occur over
time on a collection of processes. This maps well to the posting
of memes on different platforms: each community can be seen
as a process, and an event occurs each time a meme image is
posted on one of the communities. Events on one process can
cause impulses that can increase the likelihood of subsequent
events, including other processes, e.g., a person might see a
meme on one community and re-post it, or share it to a dif-
ferent one. This approach allows us to assess the causality of
events, hence it is a far better approach when compared to sim-
ple approaches like looking at the timeline of specific memes
or pHashes.
5.1 Hawkes Processes
To model the spread of memes on Web communities, we
use a similar approach as in our previous work [86], which
looked at the spread of mainstream and alternative news URLs.
Next, we provide a brief description, and present an improved
method for estimating influence.
We use five processes, one for each of our seed Web com-
munities (/pol/, Gab, and The Donald), as well as Twitter and
Reddit, fitting a separate model for each meme cluster. Fitting
the model to the data yields a number of values: background
rates for each process, weights from each process to each other,
and the shape of the impulses an event on one process causes
on the rates of the others. The background rate is the expected
rate at which events will occur on a process without influence
from the communities modeled or previous events; this cap-
tures memes posted for the first time, or those seen on a com-
munity we do not model and then reposted on a community we
do. The weights from community-to-community indicate the
effect an event on one has on the others; for example, a weight
from Twitter to Reddit of 1.2 means that each event on Twit-
ter will cause an expected 1.2 additional events on Reddit. The
shape of the impulse from Twitter to Reddit determines how
the probability of these events occurring is distributed over
time; typically the probability of another event occurring is
highest soon after the original event and decreases over time.
Figure 10 illustrates a Hawkes model with three processes.
The first event occurs on process B, which causes an increase
in the rate of events on all three processes. The second event
then occurs on process C, again increasing the rate of events on
the processes. The third event occurs soon after, on process A.
The fourth event occurs later, again caused by the background
arrival rate on process B, after the increases in arrival rate from
the other events have disappeared.
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Figure 10: A Hawkes model with three processes. Events cause im-
pulses that increase the rate of subsequent events in the same or other
processes. By looking at the impulses present when events occur, the
probability of a process being the root cause of an event can be de-
termined. Note that on the second part of the figure, colors represent
events while arrows represent impulses between the events.
To understand the influence different communities have on
the spread of memes, we want to be able to attribute the cause
of a meme being posted back to a specific community. For
example, if a meme is posted on /pol/ and then someone sees
it there and posts it on Twitter where it is shared several times,
we would like to be able to say that /pol/ was the root cause
of those events. Obviously, we do not actually know where
someone saw something and decided to share it, but we can,
using the Hawkes models, determine the probability of each
community being the root cause of an event.
Looking again at Figure 10, we see that events 1 and 4 are
caused directly by the background rate of process B. This is
because, in the case of event 1, there are no previous events on
other processes, and in the case of event 4, the impulses from
previous events have already stopped. Events 2 and 3, however,
occur when there are multiple possible causes: the background
rate for the community and the impulses from previous events.
In these cases, we assign the probability of being the root cause
in proportion to the magnitudes of the impulses (including the
background rate) present at the time of the event. For event 2,
the impulse from event 1 is smaller than the background rate
of community C, so the background rate has a higher proba-
bility of being the cause of event 2 than event 1. Thus, most
of the cause for event 2 is attributed to community C, with a
lesser amount to B (through event 1). Event 3 is more com-
plicated: impulses from both previous events are present, thus
the probability of being the cause is split three ways, between
the background rate and the two previous events. The impulse
from event 2 is the largest, with the background rate and event
1 impulse smaller. Because event 2 is attributed both to com-
munities B and C, event 3 is partly attributed to community B
through both event 1 and event 2.
In the rest of our analysis, we use this new measure. This is a
/pol/ Twitter Reddit T D Gab
1,574,045 865,885 581,803 81,924 44,918
Table 7: Events per community from the 12.6K clusters.
substantial improvement over the influence estimation in [86],
which used the weights from source to destination community,
multiplied by the number of events on the source to estimate
influence. However, this only looks at influence across a single
“hop” and would not allow us to understand the source com-
munity’s influence as memes spread onwards from the desti-
nation community. The new method allows us to gain an un-
derstanding of where memes that appear on a community orig-
inally come from, and how they are likely to spread from com-
munity to community from the original source.
5.2 Influence
We fit Hawkes models using Gibbs sampling as described
in [62] for the 12.6K annotated clusters; in Table 7, we report
the total number of meme images posted to each community in
these clusters. As seen in Table 7, /pol/ has the greatest num-
ber of memes posted, followed by Twitter and then Reddit.
In terms of total images collected (see Table 1), Twitter and
Reddit have many more than /pol/. However, many of the im-
ages on these communities might not be memes; additionally,
because our clusters are created from the memes present on
only /pol/, The Donald, and Gab (as these are the communi-
ties primarily of interest in this paper), it is possible that there
are memes on Twitter and Reddit that are not included in the
clusters. This yields an additional interesting question: how ef-
ficient are different communities at disseminating memes?
First, we report the source of events in terms of the percent
of events on the destination community. This describes the re-
sults in terms of the data as we have collected it, e.g., it tells us
the percentage of memes posted on Twitter that were caused
by /pol/. The second way we report influence is by normal-
izing the values by the total number of events in the source
community, which lets us see how much influence each com-
munity has, relative to the number of memes they post—in
other words, their efficiency.
We first look at the influence of all clusters together. Fig-
ure 11 shows the percent of events on each destination commu-
nity caused by each source community. The values from one
community to the same community (for example, from /pol/
to /pol/) include both events caused by the background rate of
that community and events caused by previous events within
that community; these values are the largest influence for each
community. After this, /pol/ is the strongest source of influence
for Reddit, The Donald, and Gab, but not for Twitter, which is
most influenced by Reddit. Interestingly, although Twitter has
a greater number of memes posted than Reddit, it causes less
influence. Perhaps there is less original content posted directly
to Twitter.
Next, we look at the normalized influence of all clusters to-
gether. Figure 12 shows the influence that a source commu-
nity has on a destination community, normalized by the total
number of memes posted on the source community. The val-
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Figure 11: Percent of destination events caused by the source com-
munity on the destination community. Colors indicate the largest-to-
smallest influences per destination.
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Figure 12: Influence from source to destination community, normal-
ized by the number of events in the source community. Columns for
total influence and total external influence are shown.
ues can be understood as an indication of how much influence
a community has, relative to the frequency of memes posted.
For example, the influence Reddit has on Twitter is equal to
5.71% of the total events on Reddit. If the sum of values for a
source is less than 100%, it implies that many of the posts on
the source community were caused by other communities, or
that posts on the source community do not cause many posts
on other communities.
There are several interesting things to note in Figure 12.
First, The Donald has by far the greatest influence for the num-
ber of memes posted on it. This is particularly apparent when
looking at just external influence, where The Donald has more
than 4 times as much influence than the rest of Reddit, the clos-
est other community. Memes from this community spread very
well to all of the other communities. While /pol/ has a large to-
tal influence on the other communities (as seen in Figure 11),
when normalized by its size, it has the smallest external influ-
ence: just 4.03%. Most of the memes posted on /pol/ do not
spread to other communities. Both Gab and Twitter have a to-
tal normalized influence of less than 100%; much less in Gab’s
case, although it has higher external influence.
Using the clusters identified as either racist or non-racist
(see the end of Section 4.2.1), we compare how the commu-
nities influence the spread of these two types of content. Fig-
ure 13 shows the percentage of both the destination commu-
nity’s racist and non-racist meme posts caused by the source
community. We perform two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests to compare the distributions of influence from the racist
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Figure 13: Percent of the destination community’s racist (R) and non-
racist (NR) meme postings caused by the source community. Colors
indicate the percent difference between racist and non-racist.
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Figure 14: Percent of the destination community’s political (P) and
non-political (NP) meme postings caused by the source community.
Colors indicate the percent difference between political and non-
political.
and non-racist clusters; cells with statistically significant dif-
ferences between influence of racist/non-racist memes (with
p<0.01) are reported with a * in the figure. /pol/ has the most
total influence for both racist and non-racist memes, with the
notable exception of Twitter, where Reddit has the most the
influence. Interestingly, while the percentage of racist meme
posts caused by /pol/ is greater than non-racist for Reddit,
Twitter, and Gab, this is not the case for The Donald. The
only other cases where influence is greater for racist memes
are Reddit to The Donald and Gab to Reddit.
When looking at political vs non political memes (Fig-
ure 14), we see a somewhat different story. Here, /pol/ influ-
ences The Donald more in terms of political memes. Further,
we see differences in the percent increase and decrease of in-
fluence between the two figures (as indicated by the cell col-
ors). For example, Twitter has a relatively larger difference in
its influence on /pol/ and Reddit for political and non-political
memes than for racist and non-racist memes, but a smaller dif-
ference in its influence on Gab and The Donald. This exposes
how different communities have varying levels of influence de-
pending on the type of memes they post.
While examining the raw influence provides insights into
the meme ecosystem, it obscures notable differences in the
meme posting behavior of the different communities. To
explore this, we look at the normalized influence in Fig-
ure 15 (racist/non-racist memes) and Figure 16 (political/non-
political memes). As mentioned previously, normalization re-
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Figure 15: Influence from source to destination community of racist
and non-racist meme postings, normalized by the number of events in
the source community.
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Figure 16: Influence from source to destination community of polit-
ical and non-political meme postings, normalized by the number of
events in the source community.
veals how efficient the communities are in disseminating
memes to other communities by revealing the per meme in-
fluence of meme posts. First, we note that the percent change
in influence for the dissemination of racist/non-racist memes
is quite a bit larger than that for political/non-political memes
(again, indicated by the coloring of the cells). More interest-
ingly, both figures show that, contrary to the total influence,
/pol/ is the least influential when taking into account the num-
ber of memes posted. While this might seem surprising, it ac-
tually yields a subtle, yet crucial aspect of /pol/’s role in the
meme ecosystem: /pol/ (and 4chan in general) acts as an evo-
lutionary microcosm for memes. The constant production of
new content [22] results in a “survival of the fittest” [16] sce-
nario. A staggering number of memes are posted on /pol/, but
only the best actually make it out to other communities. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first result quantifying this
analogy to evolutionary pressure.
Take-Aways. There are several take-aways from our measure-
ment of influence. We show that /pol/ is, generally speak-
ing, the most influential disseminator of memes in terms of
raw influence. In particular, it is more influential in spread-
ing racist memes than non-racist one, and this difference is
deeper than in any other community. There is one notable ex-
ception: /pol/ is more influential in terms of non-racist memes
on The Donald. Relatedly, /pol/ has generally more influence
in terms of spreading political memes than other communi-
ties. When looking at the normalized influence, however, we
surface a more interesting result: /pol/ is the least efficient
in terms of influence while The Donald is the most efficient.
This provides new insight into the meme ecosystem: there are
clearly evolutionary effects. Many meme postings do not result
in further dissemination, and one of the key components to en-
suring they are disseminated is ensuring that new “offspring”
are continuously produced. /pol/’s “famed” meme magic, i.e.,
the propensity to produce and heavily push memes, is thus the
most likely explanation for /pol/’s influence on the Web in gen-
eral.
6 Related Work
We now review prior work studying the detection, evolution,
and propagation of memes, their popularity, as well as vari-
ous case studies. For each work, we also report whether they
consider text, images, and/or videos.
Detection and Propagation of Memes. Leskovec et al. [60]
perform large-scale tracking of text-based memes, focusing on
news outlets and blogs. Ferrara et al. [17] detect text memes
using an unsupervised framework based on clustering tech-
niques. Dang et al. [11] study memes on Reddit by cluster-
ing submissions and using a set of similarity scores based on
Google Tri-grams. Ratkiewicz et al. [69] introduce Truthy, a
framework supporting the analysis of the diffusion of text-
based, politics-related memes on Twitter. Babaei et al. [5]
study Twitter users’ preferences, with respect to information
sources, including how they acquire memes. Romero et al. [72]
study meme propagation on Twitter via hashtags, finding dif-
ferences according to the topic and that politically-related
hashtags, mainly about controversial topics, are persistent on
the platform. Dubey et al. [14] extract a rich semantic em-
bedding corresponding to the template used for the creation
of meme images, using deep learning and optical character
recognition techniques. They demonstrate the efficacy of their
approach on a variety of tasks ranging from image clustering
to virality prediction on datasets obtained from Reddit as well
as scraped data from sites for generating meme images like
memegenerator.net and quickmeme.com. By contrast, we fo-
cus on the detection and propagation of image-based memes
without limiting our scope to image macros. To this end, we re-
duce the dimensionality of raw images using perceptual hash-
ing, and use clustering techniques to identify groups of memes.
We also detect and study the propagation of memes across
multiple Web communities, using publicly available data from
memes annotation sites (i.e., KYM).
Popularity of Memes. Weng et al. [81, 82] study the popular-
ity of memes spreading as hashtags on Twitter. They model
virality using an agent-based approach, taking into account
that users have a limited capacity in receiving/viewing memes
on Twitter. They study the features that make memes popular,
finding that those based on network community structures are
strong indicators of popularity. Tsur and Rappoport [79] pre-
dict popularity of text-based memes on Twitter using linguistic
characteristics as well as cognitive and domain features. Ienco
et al. [23] study memes propagating via text, images, audio,
and video on the Yahoo! Meme platform (a platform discon-
tinued in 2012), aiming to predict virality and select memes to
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be shown to users after login. Coscia [10] studies meme im-
ages and distinguishes the traits that make them more likely to
be popular on the Web, presenting a case study on the Quick-
meme generator site.
Whereas, we also study the popularity of memes, however,
unlike previous work, we rely on a multi-platform approach,
encompassing data from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab, and
show that the popularity of memes depends on the Web com-
munity and its ideology. For instance, /pol/ is well-known for
its anti-semitic ideology and in fact the “Happy Merchant”
meme [36] is the 3rd most popular meme on /pol/.
Evolution of Memes. Adamic et al. [4] study the evolution of
text-based memes on Facebook, showing that it can be mod-
eled by the Yule process. They find that memes significantly
evolve and new variants appear as they propagate, and that
specific communities within the network diffuse specific vari-
ants of a meme. Bauckhage [6] study the temporal dynamics
of 150 memes using data from Google Insights as well as so-
cial bookmarking services like Digg, showing that different
communities exhibit different interests/behaviors for different
memes, and that epidemiology models can be used to predict
the evolution and popularity of memes. Simmons et al. [76]
focus on detecting and studying the evolution of memes that
are propagated via quoted text, finding that mutations of text
are surprisingly frequent.
By contrast, we study the temporal aspect of memes using
Hawkes processes. This statistical framework allows us to as-
sess the causality of the posting of memes on various Web
communities, thus modeling their evolution and their influence
across multiple communities.
Generating Memes. Oliveira et al. [66] study the challenges
of creating memes, both for humans and automated bots. They
build and test an automated meme creator bot, which com-
bines a headline with an image macro and posts the resulting
meme on Twitter: while generated posts are easily recogniz-
able as memes, the bot fails to produce humorous memes – a
task that is challenging for humans too. Wang and Wen [80]
study memes from sites like memegenerator.net that have im-
ages embedded with text, focusing on the correlations between
the text and the characteristics of the image, ultimately propos-
ing a non-paranormal approach for generating text from an im-
age macro.
Case Studies. Heath et al. [20] present a case study of how
people perceive memes with a focus on urban legends, finding
that they are more willing to share memes that evoke stronger
disgust. Shifman and Thelwall [75] study the diffusion, evo-
lution, and translation of single memes (i.e., specific jokes)
by relying on a mixed-methods approach based on clustering
and search engine queries on the Web. Shifman [74] analyzes
30 video memes on YouTube, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, finding that meme videos have several common features
like humor, simplicity, and repetitiveness. Xie et al. [83] also
focus on YouTube memes, performing a large-scale keyword-
based search for videos related to the Iranian election in 2009,
extracting frequently used images and video segments. They
show that most of the videos are not original, thus, meme-
related techniques can be exploited to deduplicate content and
capture the content diffusion on the Web. Finally, Dewan et
al. [13] study the sentiment and content of images that are dis-
seminated during crisis events like the 2015 Paris terror at-
tacks. They analyze 57K images related to the attacks, finding
instances of misinformation and conspiracy theories.
We also present a case study focusing on image memes of
Pepe the Frog (see the discussion about Figure 6). This show-
cases both the overlap and the diversity of certain memes, as
well as how memes can be influenced by real-world events,
with new variants being generated. For instance, after the UK
Brexit referendum in 2016, memes with Pepe the Frog started
to be used in the Brexit context (see Appendix E). This also
demonstrates how our processing pipeline can effectively un-
cover interesting overlaps and characteristics across memes.
Fringe Communities. Previous work has also shed light
on fringe Web communities like 4chan, Gab, and sub-
communities within Reddit. Bernstein et al. [7] study the
ephemerality and anonymity features of the 4chan community
using data from the Random board (/b/). Hine et al. [22] focus
on /pol/, analyzing 8M posts and detecting a high volume of
hate speech as well as the phenomenon of “raids,” i.e., coor-
dinated attacks aimed at disrupting other services. Zannettou
et al. [85] analyze 22M posts from 336K users on Gab, find-
ing that hate speech occurs twice as much as in Twitter, but
twice less than /pol/. They also highlight a strong presence of
alt-rights users previously banned from mainstream social net-
works. Snyder et al. [77] measure doxing on 4chan and 8chan,
while Chandrasekharan et al. [8] introduce a computational
approach to detect abusive content also looking at 4chan and
Reddit.
Finally, Hawkes processes have also been used to quan-
tify influence of fringe Web communities like /pol/ and
The Donald to mainstream ones like Twitter in the context of
misinformation [86]. We follow a similar approach here, but
use an improved method of determining the influence of the
different communities.
7 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a large-scale measurement study of
the meme ecosystem. We introduced a novel image process-
ing pipeline and ran it over 160M images collected from four
Web communities (4chan’s /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab).
We clustered images from fringe communities (/pol/, Gab, and
Reddit’s The Donald) based on perceptual hashing and a cus-
tom distance metric, annotated the clusters using data gathered
from Know Your Meme, and analyzed them along a variety of
axes. We then associated images from all the communities to
the clusters to characterize them through the lens of memes
and the influence they have on each other.
Our analysis highlights that the meme ecosystem is quite
complex, with intricate relationships between different memes
and their variants. We found important differences between
the memes posted on different communities (e.g., Reddit and
Twitter tend to post “fun” memes, while Gab and /pol/ racist or
political ones). When measuring the influence of each commu-
nity toward disseminating memes to other Web communities,
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we found that /pol/ has the largest overall influence for racist
and political memes, however, /pol/ was the least efficient, i.e.,
in terms of influence w.r.t. the total number of memes posted,
while The Donald is very successful in pushing memes to both
fringe and mainstream Web communities.
Our work constitutes the first attempt to provide a multi-
platform measurement of the meme ecosystem, with a focus
on fringe and potentially dangerous communities. Consider-
ing the increasing relevance of digital information on world
events, our study provides a building block for future cultural
anthropology work, as well as for building systems to protect
against the dissemination of harmful ideologies. Moreover, our
pipeline can already be used by social network providers to
assist the identification of hateful content; for instance, Face-
book is taking steps to ban Pepe the Frog used in the context
of hate [59], and our methodology can help them automatically
identify hateful variants. Finally, our pipeline can be used for
tracking the propagation of images from any context or other
language spheres, provided an appropriate annotation dataset.
Performance. We also measured the time that it takes to asso-
ciate images posted on Web communities to memes. All other
steps in our system are one-time batch tasks, only executed
if the annotations dataset is updated. To ease presentation, we
only report the time to compare all the 74M images from Twit-
ter (the largest dataset) against the medoids of all 12K an-
notated clusters: it took about 12 days on our infrastructure,
equipped with two NVIDIA Titan Xp GPUs. This corresponds
to 14ms per image, or 73 images per second. Note that, if new
GPUs are added to our infrastructure, the workload would be
divided equally across all GPUs.
Future work. In future work, we plan to include memes
in video format, thus extending to other communities (e.g.,
YouTube). We also plan to study the content of the posts that
contain memes, incorporating OCR techniques to capture as-
sociated text-based features that memes usually contain, and
improving on KYM annotations via crowdsourced labeling.
While shedding light on the Internet meme ecosystem, our
findings yield a number of future directions exploring, e.g.,
where memes are first created, understanding components of
a meme that might increase/decrease its chance of dissemina-
tion, gaining a better understanding of the various families of
memes, how they influence public opinion, and so on.
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A Clustering Parameter Selection
Our implementation uses the DBSCAN algorithm with a clus-
tering threshold equal to 8. To select this threshold, we perform
the clustering step while varying the distances. Table 8 shows
the number of clusters and the percentage of images that are
regarded as noise by the clustering algorithm for varying dis-
tances. We observe that, for distances 2-4, we have a substan-
tially larger percentage of noise, while with distance 10 we
have the least percentage of noise. With distances between 6
and 8 we observe that we get a larger number of clusters than
the other distances, while the noise percentages are 73% and
63%, respectively.
To further evaluate the clustering performance for varying
distances, we randomly select 200 clusters and manually cal-
culate the number of images that are false positives within each
cluster. Figure 17 shows the CDF of the false positive fraction
in the random sample of clusters for distances 6, 8, and 10 (we
disregard distances 2-4 due to the high percentage of noise).
Distance 10 yields a high number of false positives, while dis-
tances 6-8 the overall false positives are below 3%. Therefore,
we investigate the impact of these false positives in the overall
dataset, looking at all posts that contain false and true posi-
tives in the random sample of 200 clusters, using distance 8.
We find that the false positives have little impact as they occur
substantially fewer times than true positives: the percentage of
true positives over the set of false positives and true positives is
99.4%. Thus, due to the larger number of clusters, the accept-
Distance #Clusters %Noise
2 30,327 82.9%
4 34,146 78.5%
6 37,292 73.0%
8 38,851 62.8%
10 30,737 27.8%
Table 8: Number of clusters and percentage of noise for varying clus-
tering distances.
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Figure 17: Fraction of false positives in clusters with varying cluster-
ing distance.
able false positive performance, and the smaller percentage of
noise (when compared to distances 2-6), we elect to use as a
threshold the perceptual distance that is equal to 8.
B KYM and Clustering Annotation
Evaluation
While KYM might not be a household name, the site is seem-
ingly the largest curated collection of memes on the Web, i.e.,
KYM is as close to an “authority” on memes as there is. That
said, crowdsourcing is an aspect of how KYM works, and thus
there might be questions as to how “legitimate” some of the
content is. To this end, we set out to measure the quality of
KYM by sampling a number of pages and manually examin-
ing them. This is clearly a subjective task, and a fully specified
definition of what makes a valid meme is approximately as dif-
ficult as defining “art.” Nevertheless, the authors of this paper
have, for better or worse, collectively spent thousands of hours
immersed in the communities we explore; thus, while we are
not confident in providing a strict definition of a meme, we are
in claiming that we know a meme when we see it.
Using the same randomly selected 200 clusters as men-
tioned in Appendix A, we visited each KYM page the cluster
was tagged with and noted whether or not it properly docu-
mented what we consider an “actual” meme. The 200 clus-
ters were mapped to 162 unique KYM pages, and of these 162
pages, 3 (1.85%) we decided were “bad.” This is mainly due
to the lack of completeness and relatively high number of ran-
dom images in the gallery (see [42, 57] for some examples of
“bad” KYM entries).
Next, we set out to determine whether the label (i.e., KYM
page) assigned to each of our randomly sampled clusters was
appropriate. Using three annotators, for each cluster we exam-
ined the KYM page, the medoid of the cluster, and the im-
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Figure 18: Architecture of the deep learning model for detecting screenshots from Twitter, /pol/, Reddit, Instagram, and Facebook.
ages in the cluster itself and noted whether the label does in
fact apply to the cluster. Here, again, there is a great degree of
subjectivity. To reign some of the subjectivity in, we used the
following guidelines:
1. If the exact image(s) in the cluster appear in the KYM
gallery, then the label is correct.
2. For images that do not appear in the KYM gallery, if the
label is appropriate, then it is a correct labeling.
There are some important caveats with these guidelines.
First, KYM galleries are crowdsourced, and while curated to
some extent, the possibility for what amounts to random im-
ages in a gallery does exist; however, based on our assessment
of KYM page validity, this occurs with low probability. Sec-
ond, we considered a label correct if it was appropriate, even
if it was not necessarily the best possible label. For example,
as our results show, many memes are related, and many images
mix and match pieces of various memes. While it is definitely
true that there might be better labels that exist for a given clus-
ter, this straightforward and comprehensible labeling process
is sufficient for our purposes. We leave a more in-depth study
of the subjective nature of memes for future work. Finally, it is
important to note that memes are a cultural phenomenon, and
thus the potential for cultural bias in our annotation is possible.
Note that our annotators were born in three different countries
(USA, Italy, and Cyprus), only one is a native English speaker,
and two have spent substantial time in the US.
After annotating clusters, we compute the Fleis agreement
score (κ). With our cluster samples, we achieve κ=0.67, which
is considered “substantial” agreement. Finally, for each cluster
we obtain the majority agreement of all annotators to assess
the accuracy of our annotation process; we find that 89% of the
clusters had a legitimate annotation to a specific KYM entry.
C Screenshot Classifier
We now provide details on our screenshot classifier mentioned
in Step 4 in Figure 2).
Dataset. Table 9 summarizes the dataset used for training the
classifier. It includes 28.8K images that depict posts from Twit-
ter, 4chan, Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram, which we collect
from public sources. First, we download images from specific
subreddits that only allow screenshots from a particular com-
munity. For example, the 4chan subreddit require all submis-
sions to be of a screenshot of a 4chan thread. Next, we use
the Pinterest platform to download specific boards that contain
mostly screenshots from the communities we study. Also, we
Platform Twitter 4chan Reddit Facebook Instagram Other
# images 14,602 10,127 2,181 1,414 497 10,630
Table 9: Curated dataset used to train the screenshot classifier.
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Figure 19: ROC curve of the screenshot classifier.
search and obtain image datasets that are publicly available on
Web archiving services like the Wayback Machine. We then
manually filter out images that were misplaced. Finally, we in-
clude 10K random images posted on /pol/ (i.e., a subset of the
4.3M images collected for our measurements).
Classifier. To detect screenshots that contain images from one
of the social networks included in our dataset, we use Convolu-
tional Neural Networks. Figure 18 provides an overview of our
classifier’s architecture. It includes two Convolutional Neural
Networks, each followed by a max-pooling layer. The output
of these layers is fed to a fully-connected dense layer compris-
ing 512 units. Finally, we have another fully-connected layer
with two units, which outputs the probability that a particular
image is a screenshot from one of the five social networks and
the probability that an image is a random one. To avoid overfit-
ting on the two last fully-connected layers, we apply Dropout
with d = 0.5 [78]. This means that, while training, 50% of the
units are randomly omitted from updating their parameters.
Experimental Evaluation. Our implementation uses
Keras [9] with TensorFlow as the backend [3]. To train our
model, we randomly select 80% of the images and evaluate
based on the rest 20% out-of-sample dataset. Figure 19 shows
the ROC curve of the model. We observe that the devised
classifier exhibits acceptable performance with an Area Under
the Curve (AUC) of 0.96. We also evaluate our model in terms
of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score, which amount to
91.3%, 94.3%, 93.5%, and 93.9%, respectively.
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Figure 20: Images that are part of the Dubs Guy/Check Em Meme.
Figure 21: Images that are part of the Nut Button Meme.
D Clusters examples
As anticipated in Section 4.1, we also present some examples
of clusters showcasing how the proposed pipeline can effec-
tively detect and group images that belong to the same meme.
Specifically, Figure 20 shows a subset of the images from
the Dubs Guy/Check Em meme [32], Figure 21 a subset of
images that belong to the Nut Button meme [43], while Fig-
ure 22 – to the Goofy’s Time meme [35]. Note that all these
images are obtained from /pol/ clusters.
In all clusters, we observe similar variations, i.e., variations
of Donald Trump, Adolf Hitler, The Happy Merchant, and
Pepe the Frog appear in all examples. Once again, this em-
phasizes the overlap that exists among memes.
E Interesting Images
Finally, we report some “interesting” examples of images from
our frogs case study (see Section 4.1.2), as well as an exam-
ple of an image for enhancing/penalizing the public image of
specific politicians (as discussed in Section 4.2.1).
Specifically, Figure 23 shows an image connecting the
Smug Frog [52] and the ISIS memes [37]. Also, Figure 24
shows an image connecting the Smug Frog and the Brexit
meme [56]. Finally, Figure 25 shows a graphic image found
in /pol/ that aims to attack the image of Hillary Clinton, while
boosting that of Donald Trump. (The image depicts Hillary
Clinton as a monster, Medusa, while Donald Trump is pre-
sented as Perseus, the hero who beheaded Medusa.)
Furthermore, some of the communities we study in the cur-
rent work have taken an interest in our previous work. /pol/ has
taken a particular interest, and as additional evidence to the
Figure 22: Images that are part of the Goofy’s Time Meme.
community’s meme creating “ability,” Figures 26 and 27 are
two sample memes created in response to our work. Figure 26
is a manipulated photo of the 6th author, originally taken as
part of an interview for Nature News. /pol/ seized upon this
opportunity and, during the course of one discussion thread4,
decided that he “definitely masturbates to beavers,” creating
Figure 26 to prove the point. Figure 27, which appeared in a
recent /pol/ thread5, is an edited version of a photo, related to
a Simpsons derived meme, of the 3rd author giving a talk on
our previous work.
In addition, after the release of the initial version of this pa-
per, /pol/ quickly picked up and its users started generating
memes. For example, they photoshopped the face of the first
author on top of a “comfy pepe” meme, the particular variant
of which is actually a screenshot from our previous work [21],
hence creating the new “very comfy Savvas Zannettou” vari-
ant in Figure 28.6 At the same time, Figure 7 from the current
work became a meme itself, as /pol/ users treated it as a base
upon which to build further memes. Figure 29 shows the graph
with /pol/’s “logo,” Figure 30 the graph combined with a vari-
ation of the Smug Frog Meme, Figure 31 the same gra[h with
the “comfy pepe” meme, while the newly created “very comfy
Savvas Zannettou” appears as a variant too (see Figure 32).
To conclude, our work also attracted the interest of the press,
and journalists have created their own memes about our paper.
For instance, in a Quartz article7, an Expanding Brain meme
was created and shared showing the use of memes by peo-
ple, while in an IFLSCIENCE article8 a Distracted Boyfriend
Meme was shared showing our particular value to the scien-
tific community: we have, in large part, quantified some fun-
damental aspects of memes on the Internet, leaving the rest of
the community to focus on other areas of curiosity.
4http://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/129243152/
5http://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/172617415/
6http://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/175115412
7https://goo.gl/KubZjX
8https://goo.gl/YKVjw2
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Figure 23: Image that exists in the clusters that are connected with
frogs and Isis Daesh.
Figure 24: Image that exists in the clusters that are connected with
frogs and Brexit.
Figure 25: Meme that is used for enhancing/penalizing the public im-
age of specific politicians. Hillary Clinton is represented as Medusa,
a monster, while Donald Trump is presented as Perseus (the hero who
beheaded Medusa).
Figure 26: A meme of the 6th author of this paper created by /pol/.
Figure 27: A meme of the 3rd author of this paper created by /pol/.
Figure 28: A meme of the 1st author of this paper created by /pol/
via modification of a Figure from the “Rare Pepe” appendix in [21].
This new variant, “a very comfy Savvas Zannettou,” is a modification
of the “comfy pepe” meme.
Figure 29: A meme created by /pol/ users combining Figure 7 with
/pol/’s logo.
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Figure 30: A meme created by /pol/ combining Figure 7 with the
Smug Frog Meme.
Figure 31: A meme created by /pol/ users combining Figure 7 with
the “comfy pepe” meme.
Figure 32: A meme created by /pol/ users combining Figure 7 with
the “very comfy Savvas Zannettou” variant from Fig 28.
Figure 33: A variant of the “expanding brain” meme created by QZ
in an article about this paper. The meme illustrates a progression of
“intelligence,” starting from people that just look at memes and cul-
minating in those that write a paper about memes (i.e., the authors of
this paper).
Figure 34: A meme created by IFLSCIENCE in an article featuring
this paper.
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